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ABSTRAK
Unit amanah saham merupakan skim pelaburan yang diuruskan oleh pengurus atau organisasi
dana dengan menawarkan pelbagai portfolio kepada pelabur. Jangka masa pelaburan biasanya
bergantung kepada matlamat amanah saham itu sendiri. Memandangkan ia melibatkan jangka
masa pemegangan yang panjang dan mendatangkan kesan berlipat-ganda, perbezaan kadar
pulangan tahunan yang meskipun kecil juga amat merugikan pelabur. Oleh yang demikian,
pernilaian terperinci diperlukan terhadap pencapaian amanah saham di samping pengurus dana
sebelum perjanjian dibuat. Seperti yang diketahui bahawa kadar pulangan yang tinggi pada satu
tempoh tunggal boleh mengelirukan jika kajian terhadap kemudahubahan pulangan pada masa
lampau tidak diambil kira. Walaupun kaedah risiko pulangan terlaras digunakan untuk
menyelesaikan masalah ini, namun hanya merupakan analisis ukuran pencapaian yang "snapshot"
sahaja. Analisis Snail Trail telah diperkenalkan untuk menyelesaikan kelemahan ini dan
memberikan gambaran yang lebih menyeluruh terhadap pencapaian para pengurus dana.
Kajian ini mengambil kira 17 buah ekuiti pertumbuhan dana. Analisis Snail Trail menunjukkan
kedua-dua amanah saham Asia Progress dan KLMF Growth telah memperlihatkan kemajuan dari
pencapaian pulangan tinggi berisiko tinggi dan pulangan rendah berisiko rendah kepada
pencapaian tinggi berisiko rendah. Sementara, tiga buah dana didapati berada di bawah paras
purata seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh gambar rajah Snail Trail. Ketiga-tiga dana ini terdiri
daripada BHLB High Growth, KLMF Industry dan KLMF Aggressive Growth. Pencapaian dana-
dana telah merosot prestasi sepanjang masa kini dari pulangan tinggi berisiko rendah kepada
pulangan rendah berisiko tinggi. Empat buah amanah saham yang terdiri daripada SBB Premium
Capital, HLB Growth, OSK Equity and RHB Capital pula menu~ukkan pencapaian risiko-
pulangan dana yang tekal.
ABSTRACT
Unit trust is an investment scheme that offers investors a well diversified portfolio managed by
a professional fund manager or organisation. The investment horizon is medium to long term
depending on the stipulated objective of the unit trust. Due to the long holding period and
compounding effect, a slight difference in the annual rate of returns can be very detrimental to
the investor. Therefore the performance of a unit trust as well as the fund manager must be
carefully evaluated before committing to the fund. As we know, a high rate of returns in a single
period can be very misleading if we do not study the volatility of the historical returns. Risk
adjusted returns offer a solution to this problem, but this is only a "snapshot" performance
measurement analysis. Snail-Trail analysis was introduced to overcome these drawbacks and
better portray the dynamic history of fund manager's performance.
17 equity growth funds were selected for the purpose of this study. From the snail-Ttrail
analysis, two promising unit trusts were found to be Asia Progress and KLMF Growth. Both funds
have shown improvement in relative performance from the "high return high risk" and "low
return low risk" quadrant moving up to "high return low risk", the most favourable, quadrant.
Meanwhile, three funds have been classified as below average as the snail trail diagrams shown
deteriorating performance. These three funds are BHLB High Growth, KLMF Industry, and
KLMF Aggressive Growth, the performance of which has been falling rapidly over recent years,
Tan Yen Keng
from the "high return low risk" quadrant to "low return high risk" quadrant. Four unit trusts
showing the most consistency in fund risk-return performance are SBB Premium Capital, HLB
Growth, aSK Equity and RHB Capital.
INTRODUCTION
Unit trust is an investment vehicle that pools
money from investors and the pooled fund will
then be invested in a diversified portfolio. The
fund will be managed by professional fund
managers or asset management organisations on
behalf of unit trusts investors. Investors can
select the unit trust based on their investment
objectives, investment strategy and risk tolerance
level.
In the selection process, besides the above
mentioned investor characteristics, the relative
performance of the unit trust also plays an
important role. Here comes the question: what
do you refer to when you want to know the
performance of a particular fund? We used to
refer to the "league table" showing various unit
trusts ranked according to their returns, or the
advertisements which highlight the impressive
high rates of return over the last "x" months or
years.
A high rate of returns in a single period can
be very misleading if we do not study the volatility
of the historical returns. Therefore the risk-
return tradeoffs must be studied. A diagram
with standard deviation of the returns on the
horizontal axis as a proxy for risk and the rate of
return on the vertical axis can be plotted. This
diagram is a step forward and allows explicit
risk-return tradeoffs to be made. This traditional
risk-return diagram presents a single or static
snapshot in time over a set period. As discussed
in Balzer (1991), to further improve the diagram,
multiple points, each representing a set of risk-
return for a specific period can be plotted on
the same diagram. This diagram portrays a
dynamic history of a single fund manager's
performance. However, this presentation is
useful only to show how a fund manager's
performance has varied over time. It fails to
reveal how much of that performance is due to
the manager's unique skill and how much is due
to fortuitous market movements enjoyed by most
managers.
A very good indication of the skill
component can be obtained by constructing a
relative risk-return history, where the median
risk and median return (for an appropriate
universe of fund managers) are subtracted from
the results. This process highlights a manager's
value-adding and risk-reduction skills relative to
its peer group.
Unlike the traditional risk-return diagram,
the snail trail approach not only shows results
relative to the median or average fund manager,
but is a robust tool for comparing fund managers'
performance.
METHODOLOGY
The relationship betw"een risk and returns can
be graphically illustrated. Relative return is
plotted on the vertical axis and relative risk is
plotted on the horizontal axis.
The first point on the risk-return graph is
plotted as usual. The beginning and end points
of the period are then rolled forward by one
quarter and the return and risk for the new
period are calculated and plotted on the same
graph. By repeating this process, a trajectory is
traced out dynamically in risk-return space.
After the compound average annual returns
over the period (4 quarters) are calculated, the
median returns for the same period for the
universe of pooled funds are subtracted to give
the relative returns.
To measure risk, there are a number of
alternative computations. As in Grinblatt et al.
(1994) and Woodward (1983), the most
commonly accepted measure of risk, standard
deviation of returns, has been chosen for these
analysis. The standard deviation of quarterly
returns over the period is calculated and
annualised using the standard +4 factor (which
implicitly assumes a random walk stochastic
model for the return series). The relative risk is
then calculated by subtracting the median
standard deviation for the group of fund
managers and is plotted on the horizontal axis.
It is important to note that the horizontal
axis is not the standard deviation of the relative
returns, but the relative standard deviation of
the total returns. Use of the former would show
how well a particular fund manager tracked the
median. This might or might not be a useful
measure depending on one's purpose. A low
figure would simply indicate that the manager
has nicely tracked the median, which itself might
be undesirably volatile. On the other hand, a
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low figure for relative standard deviation, as
defined in this paper, implies low volatility of
returns in the absolute sense, which is clearly
desirable.
After the first point is plotted, the period is
rolled forward one quarter and the calculation
is repeated. One of the major advantages of the
above rolling approach is that, all results are
revealed - good or bad. The performance
figures used in this paper are "after fee".
Fairly obvious, desirable above median
returns appear above the horizontal median
return line and less-desirable below-median
results appear below it. Similarly, below-median
volatility appears on the left of the diagram and
above median volatility on the right. The most
desirable region is on the top left "high return
low risk" (HL) quadrant, while the least desirable
is the bottom right "low return high risk" (LH)
quadrant.
Irrespective of the absolute position of a set
of points on the graph, the tightness of their
grouping is a direct indication of the consistency
of a manager's risk-return performance.
Seventeen unit trust funds were selected for
the purpose of this study. These funds are
categorised as growth and equity fund in Chong
(1999). These funds are from EPF approved
unit trust companies. Only funds with more
than 100 million units in circulation will be
included. By definition, a growth fund
concentrates on investing in securities with
growth potential. Growth may come in the form
of the invested company's growth or expansion,
and capital appreciation. Growth fund, also known
as equity fund, invests mainly in shares traded on
the stock exchange. Equity funds can be made
up of local shares, shares of unlisted companies,
or shares listed on foreign stock exchanges.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
One way of visualising the relative risk-return
relationship is to think of fixing the median
"crosshairs" on a conventional risk-return
diagram in the centre of the page and then
watching how a manager moves in relation to
them as the period of analysis is rolled fonvard
in time.
Three funds with distinctive relative risk-
return performance history have been selected
for discussion.
BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund
With the objective of achieving high capital
gains through investments in companies with
high growth prospects as stated in Chong (1999),
BHLB HGrowth allocated more than 70% (73%
as of 14 April 99) of the total investment in
equity assets.
Fig. 1: The dynamic snail trail diagram
demonstrates the relative 4-quarter return/risk
performance history of BHLB HGrowth. Prior
to 96Q3, BHLB HGrowth was in the "low return
low risk" quadrant. However, the relative
performance of BHLB HGrowth improved
gradually and moved up to the upper left
quadrant, which is the "high return low risk"
quadrant. The snail trail diagram indicated
BHLB HGrowth fund manager has read the
Asian financial crisis right. This outstanding
relative performance exhibits the superior risk-
reduction and value-added skills of BHLB
HGrowth fund manager compared to the peer
group; however the good performance was not
upheld. The performance history exhibits poor
performance in the post-crash period, when the
snail trail descended from the "high return low
risk" quadrant to "low return low risk" quadrant,
and further fell into "low return high risk"
quadrant in 1999.
As a whole, from the snail trail diagram, we
can conclude that the performance of BHLB
HGrowth in pre- and post-crisis period was not
very outstanding (i.e. in the "low risk low return"
quadrant and "low return high risk" quadrant).
But performance history has shown the ability of
the fund manager in lowering the risk as well as
improving returns during the economic crisis
indicating the superior capability of the fund
manager in countering the financial turmoil.
KLMF Regular Saving
Fig. 2: From the snail trail diagram, we can see
that the relative performance history of KLMF R
Saving is not very consistent over time. This is
a very good example of dramatic changes in
performance. In 1996, KLMF R Saving was in
the "low return high risk" quadrant, and later
advanced into the "high return high risk"
quadrant. During the early stage of the financial
crisis, KLMF R Saving was in the "high return
low risk" quadrant. However, the favourable
performance was not maintained very long. After
(98Ql-98Q4), KLMF R Saving performance has
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Fig. 2: Relative risk/return history (KLMF Regular Saving)
been falling, from the "low return low risk"
quadrant to "low return high risk" or the
unfavourable quadrant. This example shows
that the single snapshot approach can be very
misleading especially when the single period
superior performance during the financial crisis
is highlighted and promoted to the public.
As KLMF R Saving's objective is to achieve
long-term capital growth while maintaining a
steady growth in income, it invested heavily in
fixed income securities (56%) and the money
market (20%) compared to other growth funds
in this study. With more than 70% of the total
funds invested in non-equity instruments during
the financial crisis, KLMF R Saving was able to
minimise risk while securing desirable returns
on investment. This might explain the KLMF R
Saving performance history plots being in the
above-median return quadrant with below
average risk during the economic slow down.
The decision of the KLMF R Saving fund
manager to reallocate the assets (from equity to
bond and cash) during the crisis added value to
the fund as well as minimised risk.
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However, during the pre-crisis period, the
performance of KLMF R Saving was below
average. Looking at the trend where the last
point of the snail trail diagram shows a fall from
"low return low risk" quadrant to "low return
high risk" quadrant, might signal unfavourable
future performance. From the dramatic
movement of the KLMF R Saving snail trail, one
should be aware of how dangerous it can be to
neglect the risk dimension or the performance
history of a fund.
MBF Growth Fund
Fig. 3: From the diagram, the performance history
of MBF Growth indicated that MBF Growth is
relatively more risky as the snail trail plots were
moving on the right-region most of the time.
Nevertheless, the relative risk increased
dramatically during the financial crisis. The
relative performance of MBF Growth was
unfavourable (i.e. located in "low return high
risk" quadrant) compared to many other growth
funds studied. However, the relative return has
shown some improvement along with the
regional economy recovery but the relative risk
is still higher than average. The last few plots
of snail trail indicated a recent movement from
the "high return high risk" quadrant to "low
return low risk" quadrant exhibiting a reduction
in return volatility.
As a whole, we can comment that the
performance of MBF Growth is moving in
tandem with aggregate market performance. The
objective of the fund i.e. to achieve growth
through capital appreciation by investing in high
growth companies in Malaysia and Asia Pacific
region, might give us an insight on the high
return volatility and explain the performance of
MBF Growth which is closely affected by the
regional equity market movement.
Overall Performance of 17 Funds
From the appendices, using snail trail analysis,
the most promising unit trusts are Asia Progress
(Appendix 2) and KLMF Growth (Appendix 8).
Both funds have shown improved relative
performance from the "high return high risk"
and "low return low risk" quadrant to "high
return low risk" or the favourable quadrant.
Four unit trusts namely SBB PCapital
(Appendix 18), HLB Growth (Appendix 7), aSK
Equity (Appendix 15) and RHB Capital
(Appendix 17) exhibit concentrated plots around
the median return and risk. The tightness of
their snail trail plots is a direct indication of the
consistency of a fund's risk-return performance.
BBMB Prime (Appendix 3) has been showing a
risk reduction trend
Three funds are classified as below average
as the snail trail diagrams show deteriorating
performance. These funds are BHLB HGrowth
(Appendix 5), KLMF Industry (Appendix 9),
and KLMF AGrowth (10), where the relative
performance has been falling rapidly over recen t
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Fig. 3: Relative risk/return history (MBF Growth Fund)
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years, from "high return low risk" quadrant to
"low return high risk" quadrant.
Seven other unit trusts did not exhibit any
significant changes in the relative performance
history. Most of these 7 funds remained in the
same quadrant throughout the study period or
moved from/to "high return high risk"(HH)
quadrant to/from "low return low risk"(LL)
quadrant. Moving between these two quadrants
basically is indifferent in terms of risk/return
tradeoffs. These 7 funds are: KLMF Regular
(remained in LL) (Appendix 11); MBf Growth
(main taied in HH) (Appendix 14); ASM (P)
and ASM FPF (from HH to LL) (Appendix 12 -
13); BHLB Emerging (from HL to HH and LL)
(Appendix 4); BIMB First (from LL to HH)
(Appendix 6); and Pacific Pearl (from LH to
LL) (Appendix 16).
CONCLUSION
From the findings, we discovered that some unit
trusts have undergone quite significant, even
dramatic, changes over the study period. The
traditional risk-return "snapshot" fails to highlight
changing performance and it fails to reveal how
much of that performance is due to the
manager's unique skill and how much is due to
fortuitous market movements enjoyed by most
managers.
Unit trust is a medium to long term
investment instrument. Therefore the initial
selection process of the fund is very important.
Any slight difference in annual returns can turn
into a very big variance at the end of the
investment horizon. For instance, 2% difference
in the annual rate of returns can be magnified
into 21.9% variation in the total returns in 10
years. From the snail trail analysis, we know that
some funds might have more than 30%
difference in their relative annual rates of returns.
Therefore, it is advisable that potential or even
existing unit trust investors be more diligent in
the selection process and might want to include
this snail trail approach as an additional analysis.
For investment purposes, investors should
avoid unit trusts that are consistently staying in
"low return high risk" quadrant. Unit trusts with
very inconsistent snail trail plots over time are
also undesirable because the dramatic movement
indicates very volatile returns, and in the long
term, total holding period returns might deviate
very much from the targeted rate. Unit trusts
located in the "high return low risk" quadrant
are preferred and followed by those located in
"low return low risk" or "high return high risk"
quadrants. Investors with different investment
objectives and risk tolerance level might be
interested in investing in funds located in these
two regions.
Again, the dynamic performance history will
save us from the pit-fall, which we might be
deceived into believing by the exaggerated "x"
period rate of returns as advertised. As a long-
term investor, we should select our investment
vehicle with great caution and not be misled by
the high return figure of any single period.
Instead, consistent long term above average
returns with low risk is most desirable.
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APPENDIX 1
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Unit Trust
Asia UT Malaysia Progress Fund
BBMB Prime Fund
BHLB Pacific Emerging Co. Growth Fund
BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund
BIMB UT First Fund
HLB Growth Fund
KLMF Growth Fund
KLMF Industry Fund
KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund
KLMF Regular Saving
MBf Growth Fund
OSK-UOB Equity Trust
Pacific Pearl Fund
RHB Capital Fund
SBB Premium Capital Fund
ASM First Public Fund
ASM Premier Fund
Type of Fund
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Syariah, Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Growth, Equity
Units in
Circulation
(million)
1998/99
151
166
384
245
235
253
658
275
310
600
118
248
278
239
304
236
215
Source: Investors' Guide To Malaysian Unit Trusts, 1999.
No. Unit Trust Fund
1 Asia UT Malaysia Progress Fund
2 BBMB Prime Fund
3 BHLB Emerging Co. Growth Fund
4 BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund
5 BIMB UT First Fund
6 HLB Growth Fund
7 KLMF Growth Fund
8 KLMF Industry Fund
9 KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund
10 KLMF Regular Saving
11 MBF Growth Fund
12 OSK-UOB Equity Trust
13 Pacific Pearl Fund
14 RHB Capital Fund
15 SBB Premium Capital Fund
16 ASM First Public Fund
17 ASM Premier Fund
Source: Investors' Guide To Malaysian Unit Trusts, 1999.
Fund Manager 1998/99
Mushthaq Ahmad Ibrahim
Koh Huat Soon
Lee Chiah Cheang
(external investment advisor)
Lee Chiah Cheang
(external investment advisor)
Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar
Arnold Lim
(external investment advisor)
Edmond Cheah Swee Leng
Edmond Cheah Swee Leng
Chong Chang Choong
Chong Chang Choong
Philip Tan Chek Boon
Lee Seng Young
Chong Sui San
David Lee Chuen Chieh
(external investment advisor)
Pearl Wong
(external investment advisor)
Zalinah A Hamid
Razali Haron
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consistently available for traders who have full use of proceeds. One crucial assumption driving
this result is the ability to sell short the cash index (or a subset of stocks in the KLSE eI). The
results also reveal that the stock index futures contract pricing is not monotonic but rather varies
over time with periods of both greater and lesser efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
A futures contract is an agreement between a
seller and a buyer that calls for the seller to
deliver to the buyer a specified quantity and
grade of an identified commodity, at a fixed
time in the future, and at a price agreed in the
contract. AIl futures contracts are traded on
designated futures exchanges. Futures markets
had their start in agriculture, with the
introduction of commodity futures contracts that
provided farmers, distributors, and processors of
agricultural products to shift the price risk of
their output to speculators. Financial futures
contracts based on financial instruments as the
underlying asset were first introduced in 1972
with the introduction of currency futures traded
on the International Monetary Market. In 1975
the Chicago Board of Trade pioneered trading
in interest rate futures and the stock index
futures were introduced in 1982 on the Kansas
City Board of Trade (KCBT).
Stock index futures contract specify an equity
index as the underlying asset. It is an agreement
between a seller and a buyer to respectively
deliver and take delivery of a basket of shares
that makes up the index, at an agreed price at a
specific future date. However, these contracts
are usually cash-settled avoiding the need to
deliver all the shares that make up the underlying
stock index.
Stock index futures contracts provide
financial executives and money managers' a risk
management tool to reduce potential losses on
a cash position.
Futures provide a more effective and flexible
alternative to adjusting the returns and risk
char..:cteristics of a cash position. For example,
using either betas or portfolio analysis only allows
the investor limited flexibility in changing the
amount of risk in the portfolio. Moreover, betas
and portfolio risk measures change over time. It
also provides speculators a degree of leverage
that typically is not available with other
instruments and allow speculators to change
their risk profiles.
Besides helping to hedge risk and alter the
risk profile of a cash portfolio, stock index futures
contracts also perform the price discovery
function. That is the stock index futures contract
prices reflect the combined views of a large
number of buyers and sellers as to the current
supply/demand situation and the relationship
of prices 12 to 18 months hence. It is an
expression of opinions concerning today's
expectations about the level of market or stock
index performance at some point in the future.
As conditions change, opinions change and
prices of futures contracts also change. The
expected changes in futures prices become
important inputs for market participants in
making effective hedging and speculative
decisions.
Besides the hedging and speculation, stock
index futures can be used for arbitrage activities.
Arbitrage is risk-free and costless activity that
aligns the fair price of a futures contract with
the current price of the contract in the market.
The logic underlying index arbitrage is that the
theoretical futures price should equal that of a
portfolio of stocks composing the index plus the
net cost of carrying the stocks until delivery. If
the futures price exceeds the price of the
portfolio by the net cost of carry, it would be
profitable for the arbitrager to buy the index
portfolio and sell futures against it. If the futures
price were less than the price of portfolio and
the costs, it would be profitable for the arbitrager
to buy the futures contract and sell the index
portfolio. Such actions force the futures price
back toward the fair price. The buying of the
futures contracts is usually done in anticipation
of share price increase and selling in anticipation
of share price decrease. However, expectations
can be wrong, and if expectations are wrong
then the selling of the underlying shares (in
case of buying the futures contracts when they
are undervalued) and buying the underlying
shares (when the futures contracts are sold when
they are overvalued) will generate some gains to
buffer losses. Without arbitrage, the futures price
could deviate significantly from the fair price,
causing hedgers to avoid using futures markets
because of poor hedging results and the
uncertainty of the pricing process.
The pricing of futures contracts and
arbitrage between futures and cash are closely
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